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William James’s Pragmatism
Ethics and The Individualism of Others
Heidi White
1 In his popular lecture “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” (1899), William James
considers the lack of awareness that we often have toward the insights of other people.
“There is no point of view absolutely public and universal,” he says, and “even prisons
and sick-rooms have their special  revelations.” While every observer “gains a partial
superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands,” the stubborn fact,
according to James, is that “neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good, is revealed
to any single observer” (1899: 149). Later, James referred to this lecture as the essay upon
which his “whole individualistic philosophy is based.”1 As it turns out, James’s concern
for the perspectives of others is actually the very essence of his famous method of truth –
and the basis for most of the rest of his pragmatic philosophy.
2 Each of us, says James, is singular and limited, and none of us can possibly account for all
truth.  “Truth  is  too  great  for  any  one  actual  mind.”2 We  are  dependent  on  “many
cognizers,” he says, when we talk about “the facts and worths of life” (Perry 1935, 2: 266).
Implicit in this observation is not only James’s respect for the revelations of others but
also his recognition of our limitations.
3 Believing that no one person has access to all truths, James stresses our ignorance and, at
the same time, recognizes our access to the unique truths of others. In another lecture,
one for college students called “What Makes Life Significant” (1900), James advises us to
“be faithful” to our opportunities to learn from other people, for this is where our truths
are to be found, in our experiences with others. And if we fear that we are not very
successful in understanding other people, James replies that we should rely on a stance of
Socratic ignorance. He asks, can we not recognize our inadequacy, and thus be more wary
in our judgments? “If we cannot gain much positive insight into one another, cannot we
at least use our sense of our own blindness to make us more cautious in going over the
dark places?” Again,  James asks,  “Cannot we escape some of  those hideous ancestral
intolerances and cruelties, and positive reversals of the truth?” (1899: 151).
4 In all these remarks, James is making an important connection between truth and his
respect for the viewpoints of others while insisting on our awareness of our ignorance.
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We may not be able to see all, but we can know that we are unseeing. We can realize our
own  limitations,  and  we  can  rely  on  a  certain  intersubjective  reciprocity.  And  this
reciprocity then becomes, in his view, the basis of further opinions about what is true and
what isn’t. Our acknowledgement of the perspectives of others is thus crucial for James –
if we are to increase our understanding.
5 For James, this same approach to truth applies not only to assertions in the scientific and
empirical worlds but also to assertions in ethics. Ethics requires that different claims be
heard and that different obligations be met. In a lecture, “The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life,” (delivered to the Yale Philosophical Club in 1891), James is explicit:
There is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in
advance. We all help to determine the content of ethical philosophy so far as we
contribute to the race’s moral life. In other words, there can be no final truth in ethics
any more than in physics, until the last man has had his experience and said his say. (1897:
141; italics added)
6 But if James was to maintain that there could be “no final truth in ethics any more than in
physics,” he would also need to present an epistemological theory that would sustain his
steady respect for the vision and experience of others – and “Pragmatism” was to be his
answer.3
 
I. Pragmatism And Amelioration
7 In the series of lectures offered in Pragmatism (1907; collected from talks delivered in
1906-07), James criticizes the epistemological notion that neutrality and objectivity are
possible in any absolute sense and argues that meaningfulness is itself always contextual.
According to James, pragmatism as a method does not pronounce judgments of truth and
falsity; rather, it is a matter of praxis – of doing and ordering.
8 In an early letter for the Nation entitled “The Teaching of Philosophy in Our Colleges”
(1876), James explains that pragmatism is no more than “the habit of always seeing an
alternative, if not taking the usual for granted; […] of imagining foreign states of mind”
(LWJ 1935, I: 190).4 In the same article, James says that the value of his philosophy lies in a
“wider openness of mind, a more flexible way of thinking” (190). And in his essay “What
Pragmatism Means,” he writes, “Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either
logic or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences” (1907b:
44). James concludes with the remark that pragmatism is fundamentally “democratic.”
James makes clear that he is concerned with the opinions of others, understood in light of
pragmatism’s maxim that there is no final truth.
9 James believes that a radically new kind of empiricism is required, and he realizes that
rationalists will probably find it unattractive. The rationalists want to discover absolute
principles and eternal truths, and they will probably find his pragmatism ignoble and
coarse – or so he suspects. James remarks,
To  rationalists  this  describes  a  tramp  and  vagrant  world,  adrift  in  space,  with
neither elephant nor tortoise to plant the sole of its foot upon. […] Such a world
would not be respectable, philosophically. It is a trunk without a tag, a dog without a
collar, in the eyes of most professors of philosophy (125).
10 James argues that for a “devotee to abstract and eternal principles” (135), the world of
the  rationalist  is  “perfect,  finished”  whereas  for  the  pragmatists  “all  is  process”  –
unfinished but filled with possibility” (127). In his essay “Pragmatism and Humanism,”
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James characterizes the rationalists as holding that “in the absolute world, where all that
is not is from eternity impossible, and all that is is necessary, the category of possibility
has no application.” By contrast, James insists that “possibilities obtain in our world.” He
argues that in the world of pragmatism “crimes and horrors are regrettable,” but in the
“totalized world” of the rationalists, “regret obtains not, for the existence of ill in the
temporal order is the very condition of the perfection of the eternal order (127-8).
11 In fact, James finds himself attacking both rationalists and empiricists, especially when he
thinks about religion. In his talk, “Pragmatism and Religion,” he remarks, “The whole
clash of rationalistic and empiricist religion is […] over the validity of possibility” (135).
The empiricist, as the “skeptical” scientist, doesn’t allow for possibility either – since the
empiricist’s view of the world is “materialistic” and “fatalistic” (12-3).
12 According to James, neither rationalism nor empiricism allows for possibility. But more
importantly,  neither  the  rationalists  nor  the  empiricists  seem to  recognize  that  the
experiences of other people are central to forming one’s own experience, whether the
subject of our experience is scientific or ethical.
13 James breaks with the empiricist model of knowledge according to which we simply look
out, like spectators, and see how the world is and collect the facts. And he also breaks
with  the  idealist  model  of  subsuming  sense  data  under  a  priori  categories.5 James
presents a rather technical critique of idealism and empiricism, but there is also more at
stake morally for James than a straightforward refutation of these two systems.6
14 James is particularly concerned that philosophy should recognize the central importance
of  making  the  world  better.  In  an  interview with  the  New  York  Times,  published  on
November  3,  1907  (the  same  year  that  Pragmatism  appeared),  James  emphasizes  the
moralism that underlies the pragmatic theory of truth: “Our minds are not here simply to
copy a reality that is already complete […] In point of fact, the use of most of our thinking
is to help us to change the world” (Perry 1935, 2: 479).
15 James agrees, of course, that we must know “what we have to change,” and that we have
to be realistic and honest in our assessment of how the world is. “Theoretic truth must at
all  times  come  before  practical  application.”  Nevertheless,  theoretic  truth,  for  the
pragmatist, remains “irrelevant unless it fits the […] purpose in hand.” James sees the use
of our “practical faculties” as an attempt “to get the world into a better shape, and all
with a good conscience” (479).
16 James  goes  so  far  as  to  speak of  “saving the  world.”  Believing that  we all  “wish to
minimize the insecurity of the universe,” James thinks that “we are and ought to be
unhappy when we regard it as exposed to every enemy and open to every life-destroying
draft”  (1907b:  137).  James  says  there  are  “concretely  grounded”  conditions  for  “the
salvation of the world.” He asks, “What does it pragmatically mean to say that this [the
salvation of the world] is possible?” He answers, it means “that some of the conditions of
the world’s deliverance do actually exist.” For James “it would contradict the very spirit
of life to say that our minds must be indifferent and neutral in questions like that of the
world’s salvation.” Indeed, says James, “anyone who pretends to be neutral writes himself
down here as a fool and a sham” (136-7).
17 When speaking to his audience of college students, James also asks them to acknowledge
their own personal ideals that they are “willing to live and work for.” Each “such ideal
realized,” James declares, “will be one moment in the world’s salvation.” Our particular
ideals are not “bare abstract possibilities,” he says, but “live possibilities.” And we are
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“their live champions.” If given the chance, our ideals may become “actual things.” James
asks, “Does our act then create the world’s salvation so far as it makes room for itself?”
And he adds,  “Here I  take the bull  by the horns,  and in spite of  the whole crew of
rationalists and monists, […] ask why not?” (137-8).7
18 James admits that there are, nevertheless, “unhappy men who think the salvation of the
world impossible; theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism.” Optimism, on the other
hand, is “the doctrine that thinks the world’s salvation inevitable” (137). Promoting a
mean  between  the  extremes,  James  envisions  “salvation  as  neither  necessary  nor
impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more of a probability the more
numerous  the  actual  conditions  of  salvation  become.”  James  thinks  it  “clear  that
pragmatism must incline towards meliorism” (137).
19 These  sentiments  of  James  make it  apparent  that  pragmatism is  not  so  much about
scientific truths as it is about ethical truths. Our experience in the world shows us that
ethical disputes cannot be settled by a simple appeal to the “moral truth.” The world
lends  itself  to  many  conflicting  interpretations:  political,  economic,  religious,  and
cultural; if we are to have any access to truth (and importantly, for James, amelioration),
then we require experience with the many interpretations of others.
20 One can see, then, why James thinks that idealism misrepresents the way we actually
have our experiences. For James, idealists assume the existence of an absolute, certain
moral truth. And James doubts the existence of any such explanatory principle, whether
it be an Absolute Mind or a doctrine of innate ideas. There is, for James, no ultimate
certainty, no “Truth” out there to be won.
21 James’s intermediate position between rationalism and empiricism leads him to a method
of truth that promotes the relation between the self and others. His critique is centered
on his belief that,  without an understanding and evaluation of the outlook of others,
there can be neither truth nor knowledge.8 There is no truth until each of us has “had his
experience and each his say.”
 
II. Temperament
22 In the opening chapter of Pragmatism, “The Present Dilemma in Philosophy,” James sets
forth  an  opposition  between  the  rationalists  like  Hegel  and  the  empiricists  such  as
J. S. Mill or Herbert Spencer. James analyzes these schools in terms of temperament –
“tender-minded”  for  the  rationalists,  “tough-minded”  for  the  empiricists.  The
rationalists, says James, are intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, “freewillist,”
monistic,  and dogmatic.  The empiricists are sensationalistic,  materialistic,  pessimistic,
irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, and skeptical (13). James advertises pragmatism as an
intermediate ground between the two – though, as we might expect, he leans toward the
open, pluralistic worldview of the tough-minded (129).
23 Comparing the rationalists to the “tender-foot Bostonians” and the empiricists to the
“Rocky Mountain toughs,” James thinks that philosophical leanings are actually matters
of personal temperament. Earlier in an essay “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879), James
underscores the difference between the two outlooks: “Idealism will be chosen by a man
of one emotional constitution, materialism by another.” Idealism offers a closeness with
the universe, the feeling of “I am all.” Others, by contrast, find in idealism “a narrow,
close, sick-room air,” leaving out an element of danger, contingency and wildness – “the
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rough,  harsh,  sea-wave,  north-wind element”  (1897:  75).  Both  the  intimacy  of  the
rationalist  and  the  wildness  of  the  empiricist  answer  to  propensities,  passions,  and
powers in human beings. The materialist desires “to escape personality, to revel in the
action of forces that have no respect for our ego, to let the tides flow, even though they
flow over us” (76).9
24 A “great religious difference,” says James, exists “between the men who insist that the
[world] must and shall be, and those who are content with the belief that the world may be,
saved” (1907b: 135). In fact, James tends to identify religion with the “sick-minded” and
moralism with the “healthy-minded.” The healthy-minded can deal with insecurity (141).
These temperaments, as “two types of religion,” are in sharp contrast. Yet a person could
also fluctuate, “healthy-minded” on one day and “sick-souled” on the next. James writes,
[…] it is impossible not to see a temperamental difference at work in the choice of
sides.  The rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and authoritative
complexion: the phrase ‘must be’ is ever on its lips. The bellyband of its universe
must  be  tight.  A  radical  pragmatist  on  the  other  hand  is  a  happy-go-lucky
anarchistic sort of creature. If he had to live in a tub like Diogenes he wouldn’t
mind at all if the hoops were loose and the staves let in the sun. (124)
25 “On the one side the universe is absolutely secure,” says James, and “on the other it is still
pursuing its adventures” (123). For James, the absolutist scheme appeals to the tender-
minded,  the pluralistic  scheme to the tough (140).  Nevertheless,  James adds,  all  this
playful talk of adventure and life in a barrel is not simply a “happy-go-lucky” adventure.
James thinks more is at risk morally. The absolutist view leads to dogmatism.
26 On moral grounds alone, if we are mere spectators with the circumspect vision of the
absolutist, we may judge others falsely because we impose on them our own standards. In
his talk “What Makes Life Significant” (1900), James warns: “No one has insight into all
the  ideals  […].  No  one  should  presume  to  judge  them  off-hand.  The  pretension  to
dogmatize about them in each other is the root of most human injustices and cruelties,
and the trait in human character most likely to make the angels weep” (1899: 150).
27 The problem, for James, is not that a logical explanation of ethical or scientific truth
cannot  be  produced  but  that  any  given  situation  admits  of  too  many  adequate
explanations. The pragmatist is one who both holds to the “scientific loyalty to facts” and
to the “old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity whether of the
religious or romantic type” (1907b: 17).
28 Although James stresses that our passions, interests, beliefs, and prejudices are involved
in science,  just  as they are in everything else,  this does not mean that there are no
standards, or that there is no evidence, or that we should not exercise special caution in
affirming scientific conclusions. James is not proposing a relativistic world; he advocates
neither a doctrine of caprice nor a denigration of all things rational, and he does not
mean  that  we  just  create,  or  make  up,  our  own  truth;  these  are  common
misinterpretations of James.10
29 Nevertheless, James emphasizes that there is no such thing as “pure” reason or “pure”
logic  –  unimpassioned  and  uninterested  –  by  which  we  can  assess  things.  “One
misunderstanding  of  pragmatism,”  says  James,  is  to  suppose  that  it  “scorns  every
rationalistic notion as so much jabber and gesticulation, that it loves intellectual anarchy
as such and prefers a sort of wolf-world absolutely unpent and wild and without a master
or a collar to any philosophic classroom product, whatsoever” (128).
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III. The Method of Truth
30 Despite his various criticisms of empiricism, James still sees pragmatism as fitting within
an  empiricist  tradition  (hence  his  dedication  of  Pragmatism  to  J. S. Mill).11 Yet  James
presents it at first not as a theory of knowledge but as a method. Pragmatism, says James,
“has no dogmas and no doctrines save its method,” and the method is characterized as “
the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of
looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts” (32).12
31 In this respect, pragmatism is the method of modern experimental science, and the idea
of truth that follows from it is functional and always approximate. New truth, says James,
“marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of
continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this ‘problem
of maxima and minima’.” Nonetheless, James cautions, “success in solving this problem is
eminently a matter of approximation” (35).
32 In another lecture from the Pragmatism series, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” James
even challenges some of the ways in which we talk about truth.
It never occurs to most of us even later that the question ‘what is the truth?’ is no
real question (being irrelative to all conditions) and that the whole notion of the 
truth  is  an  abstraction  from  the  fact  of  truths  in  the  plural,  a  mere  useful
summarizing phrase like the Latin Language or the Law. (115-6)
33 Truth  is  an  attribute  of  ideas  rather  than of  reality,  and  truth  attaches  to  ideas  in
proportion as these prove “useful.” Pragmatism is an attempt to explain how the mind
ascertains truth:  “‘The true,’  to  put  it  very briefly,  is  only the expedient  in the way of  our
thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving” (106).13 “Truth for
us,” says James, “is simply a collective name for verification processes,” and “Truth is
made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience” (104).
“All our truths,” says James, “are beliefs about ‘Reality’” (117).
34 James says, “Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is 
in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its
validity is the process of its valid-ation” (97).14 Also, according to James, truth is a “species
of the good”; truths are goods because we can “ride” on them into the future without
being unpleasantly surprised (103).
35 In James’s view, then, truths are “made” in the course of human experience. Nevertheless,
most truths live on a sort of “credit system,” meaning that we rely on other people for
their verification. We can’t verify every truth for ourselves. We could try to verify each
one, but we would never succeed. We take most of them on credit and must trust the
verifications claimed by others as much as we do our own. And these beliefs then form a
vast architecture,  says James, so that “beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the
posts of the whole superstructure” (100).
36 James calls our trust in the beliefs of others a kind of faith. Our beliefs in molecules and in
democracy (to make use of two of James’s examples) are not based on our own reasoning
alone, and certainly not on anything that we could call “pure reason,” but on our faith
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IV. Pragmatism and Humanism
37 James  notes  the  similarity  between  his  humanistic  picture  –  in  which  the  world  is
knowable by us  because we help form it  –  and the epistemological  account of  Kant.
Nevertheless, there is an important difference. James’s position is more empirical. James
is not attached to a pre-constituted set of categories. Instead, he finds his categories as he
finds  the  material  they  organize:  experimentally  and  experientially  with  others.15
According to James,
Our rights,  wrongs,  prohibitions,  penalties,  words,  forms,  idioms,  beliefs,  are  so
many new creations that add themselves as fast as history proceeds. Far from being
antecedent  principles  that  animate  the  process,  law,  language,  truth  are  but
abstract names for its results. (1907b: 116)
38 James emphasizes that, in our relation with “fixed elements of reality,” we still have “a
certain  freedom  in  our  dealings  with  them.”  There  is  no  denying,  of  course,  that
sensations  are  beyond  our  control,  but  “[that]  which  we  attend  to,  note,  and  make
emphatic  in  our  conclusions  depends  on  our  own  interests;  and  […]  as  we  lay  the
emphasis here or there, quite different formulations of truth result.” James underscores
that what we say about reality “depends on the perspective into which we throw it”
(118). Themselves, tell us nothing. “We have to speak for them” (118).
39 Sensations and relations, in Interests or values guide our knowledge, and since the reality
of objects cannot be known prior to experience, truth claims can be justified only as the
fulfillment  of  conditions  that  are  experimentally  determined.  James  describes  our
experience as given, yet we also exercise choice: “Even in the field of sensation, our minds
exert a certain arbitrary choice.
40 By our inclusions and omissions we trace the field’s extent; by our emphasis we mark its
foreground and its background; by our order we read it in this direction or in that.” And
James regards the process as creative. “We receive the block of marble, but we carve the
statue ourselves” (119).
41 The “first part of reality […] is the flux of our sensations.” Sensations are “neither true
nor false; they simply are.” The second part of reality “is the relations that obtain between
sensations or between their copies in our minds.” And the third part of reality “is the
previous truths of which every new inquiry takes account” (117-8). Although, we do not
receive our sensations as coming “without the human touch,” this part of experience “has
immediately to become humanized in the sense of being squared, assimilated or in some
way adapted, to the humanized mass already there” (119).
42 According to James, we receive sensations or “percepts” constantly, yet the sensations
are always in relation to “previous truths” or past “concepts.” There are new facts that
“men add to the matter of reality by the acts of their own lives,” as well a “whole third
part of reality which I have called ‘previous truths’.” James adds, “Every hour brings its
new percepts, its own facts of sensation and relation, to be truly taken account of; but the
whole of our past dealings with such facts is already funded in the previous truths” (119).
43 Each individual has his or her own experience, past and present, involved in the act of
subjective interpretation; pure objectivity and neutrality are impossible in James’s view:
“We shuffle our perceptions of intrinsic relation and arrange them just as freely.” “The
whole,” says James, “is flagrantly man-made.”
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44 James offers a simple example. “Waterloo,” he says, “spells a ‘victory’ for an Englishman;
for a Frenchman it spells a ‘defeat’. So for an optimist philosopher the universe spells
victory, for a pessimist, defeat” (118). “Human motives sharpen all our questions,” and
“human satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all our formulas have a human twist.” James
sees  reality  as  “plastic,”  and he  insists  that  what we have to  say  about  it  has  been
“peptonized and cooked for our consumption” by previous human thought (119-20).
45 As  we  encounter  “fresh  experience,”  the  beliefs  of  our  ancestors  and  ourselves
“determine what we notice; what we notice determines what we do; what we do again
determines what we experience.” Hence, while there is a “sensible flux, what is true of it
seems from first to last to be largely a matter of our own creation” (122).
46 James also appreciates the possibility of a new experience to create an entire revolution
within one’s worldview:
Now life abounds in [new experiences], and sometimes they are such critical and
revolutionary  experiences  that  they  change  a  man’s  whole  scale  of  values  and
system of ideas. In such cases, the old order of his habits will be ruptured; and if the
new motives are lasting, new habits will be formed, and build up in him a new and
regenerate ‘nature.’ (1899: 53)16
47 Nevertheless,  for  “pluralistic  pragmatism,”  truth  “grows  up  inside  of  all  the  finite
experiences. They lean on each other, but the whole of them, if such a whole there be,
leans  on  nothing.  All  ‘homes’  are  in  finite  experience;  finite  experience  as  such  is
homeless.” There exists “nothing outside of the flux” upon which we can secure ourselves
(1907b: 125).
48 On  the  whole,  James  presents  a  world  without  essence,  without  an  Absolute  Truth,
without a break between the self and the world. Offering a voluntaristic epistemology,
James attempts to marry the self to the world in a way that avoids idealism: “We carve
out everything just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes” (122). Yet
James,  as  indicated  earlier,  does  recognize  “resisting  factors  in  every  experience  of
truthmaking,” including not only our present sensations and experiences but the whole
body of our prior beliefs – “a whole third part of reality.” James argues neither that we
create our truths out of nothing nor that truth is entirely independent of humanity: “You
see how naturally one comes to the humanistic principle: you can’t weed out the human
contribution” (122).17
 
V. Pragmatism and Ethics
49 Truth has a function, says James, in the life of human beings – namely, to prepare them
for  successful  action  –  and  beliefs  that  best  fulfill  that  function  are  the  ones  most
deserving to be called true. Yet they can’t be much more than that, James says, since
“Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over,  and making us correct our present
formulas” (106). We exchange, lend and borrow ideas through social intercourse. We are
indebted to our social order and, importantly, to each other. No one person creates a new
science or a new ethic ex nihilo.
50 Yet how does one decide among different ethical demands when the ethical demands
conflict? Does one just impose one’s personal standards? Will an abstract principle be the
answer? For James, no philosophy of ethics in the old, a priori sense is possible. In his
lecture “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” James says we must “wait on the
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facts,” and we must always be ready to revise our theories. According to James, “ethical
science is  just  like physical  science,  and instead of  being deducible  all  at  once from
abstract principles, [it] must simply bide its time, and be ready to revise its conclusions
from day to day.” We arrive at moral foundations by a kind of “experiment,” James holds,
but there is nothing final in the results. He writes:
[…] as our present laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones, so
they will in their turn be overthrown by any newly discovered order which will
hush up the complaints that they still give rise to, without producing others louder
still. (1897: 156-7)
51 In order to hear the claims of others and to engage in moral reflection, we need to have
experiences with others. And, according to James, we need to recognize that life is often
“tragic” and “no mere speculative conundrum” (1907b: 154).
52 The  philosopher  Charlene  Seigfried  expresses  this  aspect  of  James’s  outlook  well:
“Concern for the point of view of others,” she writes, “is as central to knowledge claims as
it is to ethical claims” (1977: 93).18 According to Seigfried, James’s pluralistic conception
of truth offers “every person a unique and irreplaceable angle of vision because she or he
is differently situated and has a varied ensemble of needs and desires and a characteristic
temperament.” Thus, every person “will see and organize the world uniquely and the
knowledge gathered by the human community will be more comprehensive and valuable
to the extent that it takes account of this rich variety of resources” (92).19
53 Knowledge is essentially cooperative in James’s view, though he admits that perhaps our
understanding of the universe is actually quite inaccurate. “We may be in the universe as
dogs and cats are in our libraries, seeing the books and hearing the conversation, but
having no inkling of the meaning of it all” (1907a: 140).
54 We only have access to our own horizon and we rely on the individualism of others to fill
in the blanks. If one can’t turn to an absolute, to a grand rational spirit that unifies the
world as a whole, and if one can’t depend on a solipsistic self engaged in a skeptical
stance, then one can only rely on oneself and one’s neighbor.
55 Even in youth, James held this view. “Every thing we know and are,” James wrote to his
lifelong friend, Tom Ward, when he was still in his twenties, “is through men. We have no
revelation but through man.” James added, “Every thought you now have and every act
and  intention  owes  its  complexion  to  the  acts  of  your  dead  and  living  brothers”
(Skrupskelis 1995, 4: 249).
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NOTES
1. James made this remark in a letter to Mrs. Glendower Evans in 1899. In a letter to another
friend, he writes,  “Those who have done me the honor of reading my volume of philosophic
essays will recognize that I mean the pluralistic or individualistic philosophy” (Perry 1935, 2:
265-6).  I  take James to mean that  the pluralism of  the world is  really  about the plurality of
individuals that we encounter in our experiences.
2. See  James’s  preface  of  Talks  To  Teachers  (1899),  in  reference  to  his  essay,  “On  A  Certain
Blindness in Human Beings,” 4 (also quoted in Perry 1935, 2: 266).
3. In a paper on “How to Make Your Ideas Clear,” contributed to the Popular Science Monthly in
1878,  Charles  Sanders  Pierce  first  used  the  word  “pragmatism” to  designate  a  principle  put
forward by him as a rule for guiding the scientist and the mathematician. The Principle is that
the meaning of any conception in the mind is the practical effect it will have in action: “consider
what effects,  which might conceivably have practical  bearing,  we conceive the object  of  our
conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the
object,” 132. The rule remained unnoticed for 20 years until James took it up in the address he
delivered  at  the  Philosophical  Union  at  the  University  of  California  at  Berkeley  in  1898.
Pragmatism was not published until 1907 but even before that both in the Principles of Psychology
(1890)  and  Will  to  Believe  (1897)  there  are  clear  indications  of  a  pragmatic  view  of  both
philosophical  and psychological issues.  James’s public adherence to pragmatism is sometimes
dated from his 1898 Berkeley address “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.” Other
sources  for  Pragmatism  were  lectures  given  at  Wellesley  College  in  1905  and  at  the  Lowell
Institute and Columbia University in 1906 and 1907. Since most of James’s Pragmatism and most of
his other published works arose from his popular lectures, James did not offer detailed argument,
much to his own regret. See Perry (1935, 2: 583).
4. For the article in full, cf. Nation, Sept. 21, 1876 (XXIII).
5. Idealism, the philosophy which originates with Kant and was later developed in Germany by
Fichte,  Hegel,  Schelling,  and  Schopenhauer,  was  acquiring  popularity  in  the  United  States
(through the writings of Josiah Royce, among others).
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6. In his preface of James’s Pragmatism, H.S. Thayer also sees pragmatism as driven by an ethical
impetus: “The moral import of pragmatism is evident on every page of James’s book.” He adds,
“Knowledge,  faith,  practical  needs  of  adaptation  to  and  remolding  of  the  world,  human
temperaments and the philosophies they engender are each and all recognized and interpreted
from  his  fundamental  view  of  the  purposive  and  moral  character  of  all  human  action  and
experience,” (1907b: xxv).
7. For James, there are events – incited by ideas and emotions such love, anger or despair – that
inspire us to go beyond the everyday. These exceptional struggles generate great inner power,
courage, and risk and can make a life meaningful. See “The Energies of Man” (1906), a lecture in a
series that James delivered from 1885-99 to college students – generally at schools for women –
on education and its purposes (1982: 129-46).
8. See James’s views on “claims” and “obligations” in his lecture, “The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life” (1897).
9. James further explains,  “You see how differently people take things.  The world we live in
exists diffused and distributed, in the form of an indefinitely numerous lot of eaches, coherent in
all sorts of ways and degrees; and the tough-minded are perfectly willing to keep them at that
valuation. They can stand that kind of world, their temper being well adapted to its insecurity.
Not  so  the  tender-minded  party.  They  must  back  the  world  we  find  ourselves  born  into  by
‘another and a better’ world in which the eaches form an All and the All a One that logically
presupposes, co-implicates, and secures each each without exception” (1907b: 126-7).
10. See Putnam 1995: 24: “Some critics even read James – against repeated statements to the
contrary, explicit and implicit, in his writing – as holding that if the consequences of believing
that p are good for you, then p is ‘true for you.’ Let me say once and for all that James never said
the notion of ‘true for me’ or ‘true for you’.” Importantly, Putnam adds, “Truth, he insists, is a
notion which presupposes a community.”
11. The dedication reads, “To the Memory of John Stuart Mill from whom I first learned the
pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader.”
12. James’s method of resolving disputes and the theory of meaning are explained in a simple
story about whether a man chasing a squirrel around a tree goes around the squirrel too. James
suggests that a verbal dispute over whether or not the person “goes round” the squirrel can best
be resolved by asking disputants about the practical bearing of each alternative. Taking meaning
as the conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve, James states, the pragmatist
philosopher finds that two “practical” meanings of “go around” are in use: either the man goes
North, East, South, and West of the squirrel, or he faces first the squirrel’s head, then one of his
sides, then his tail, then his other side. James resolves the problem: “make the distinction and
there is  no occasion for  any farther dispute.”  James notes,  “[A pragmatist]  turns away from
abstraction  and  insufficiency,  from  verbal  solutions,  from  bad  a  priori  reasons,  from  fixed
principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins” (1907b: 31).
13. Also see James’s preface to The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to “Pragmatism” (1809). For many of
his readers, truth identified with the expedient, was objectionable. James attempted to respond
to these criticisms, especially in The Meaning of Truth;  his responses did little to persuade the
critics, however, since most of them were unaware of his radical empiricism.
14. Also quoted in James (1809: 2-3).
15. James  says  that  “between  categories  fulminated  before  nature  began,  and  categories
gradually forming themselves in nature’s presence, the whole chasm between rationalism and
empiricism  yawns.”  According  to  James,  “Our  rights,  wrongs,  prohibitions,  penalties,  words,
forms, idioms, beliefs, are so many new creations that add themselves as fast as history proceeds.
Far  from being antecedent  principles  that  animate the process,  law,  language,  truth are  but
abstract names for its results” (1907b: 116).
16. The essay, “The Laws of Habit,” was first published in the Popular Science Monthly (Feb 1887).
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17. James continues, “Our nouns and adjectives are all humanized heirlooms, and in the theories
we  build  them  into,  the  inner  order  and  arrangement  is  wholly  dictated  by  human
considerations, intellectual consistency being one of them […] Mathematics and logic themselves
are fermenting with human rearrangements; physics, astronomy and biology follow massive cues
of preference.”
18. Seigfried adds, “An act of living sympathy with the motives and intentions by which persons
make sense of their world gives insight into the creative spontaneity by which human beings
create stability in a world of progress.”
19. “Therefore,”  explains  Seigfried,  “it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  point  of  others  to
understand and evaluate the basis of their claims” (94).
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